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here is nothing new about arbi­
tration, a method of alternative 
dispute resolution designed to 
settle disputes more efficiently, 
cheaper, and faster than litigation.1 Today, 
mandatory arbitration clauses are ubiquitous 
in commercial contracts, social media terms 
and conditions, employment contracts, and 
more. These contracts, where one party in 
the weaker position (often a consumer or an 
employee) must either accept or reject the 
terms as written with no power to negotiate, 
are known as contracts of adhesion.2 The 
widespread use of arbitration clauses—spe­
cifically, pre­dispute, forced arbitration agree­
ments, often including class­action waiv ers 
found in adhesion contracts—has come un­
der pressure.
The criticisms
Critics of mandatory arbitration say the 
clauses deprive consumers and employees 
of their rights,3 give an unfair advantage to 
large corporations,4 and provide inadequate 
recourse for claims of civil rights abuses or 
sexual harassment.5 Equifax’s response to 
its major security breach, the fraudulent 
accounts scandal at Wells Fargo, and the 
#metoo movement have brought these is­
sues to the forefront of public conscious­
ness. In the legal field, law schools have ex­
pressed concern over “Biglaw” firms’ use of 
mandatory arbitration clauses in summer as­
sociate contracts,6 and law student groups 
have pushed for change.7 Note that these 
are not criticisms of arbitration overall, but 
rather the practice of forcing arbitration in 
these specific circumstances through use of 
mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts 
of adhesion. This practice was expressly not 
addressed by the Uniform Law Commission 
when drafting the Revised Uniform Arbitra­
tion Act,8 which Michigan adopted in 2012.9 
The issue of adhesion contracts was only 
briefly noted in Michigan’s bill analysis.10
The law
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)11—
with its mandate that arbitration agreements 
be “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract”12—
is at the heart of the current legal discussion. 
The FAA preempts state law, making state 
efforts to limit the use of mandatory arbi­
tration moot.13 Those who favor excluding 
certain disputes from the reach of the FAA 
look to the latter half of the excerpted provi­
sion: the so­called “savings clause.” Propo­
nents of arbitration clause enforcement take 
a traditional freedom of contract view and 
read the savings clause narrowly.
Recent actions
In July 2014, President Obama signed an 
executive order banning pre­dispute man­
datory arbitration agreements for claims of 
sexual assault and sexual harassment and 
violations of Title VII in new federal pro­
curement contracts over $1 million.14 Con­
gress officially disapproved the administra­
tive rules passed to implement that order15 
using powers proscribed by the Congres­
sional Review Act (CRA).16
The CRA, employed successfully only 
once by prior Congresses, has been used 
to reverse multiple instances of perceived 
regulatory or executive overreach in Presi­
dent Obama’s so­called “midnight rules” in 
the current session.17 Additionally, the Con­
sumer Financial Protection Bureau issued 
a rule prohibiting certain financial institu­
tions from using arbitration agreements that 
barred consumers from filing or participat­
ing in class­action suits.18 Congress, again 
utilizing the CRA, passed a joint resolution 
to disapprove of the rule.19
The Supreme Court has also reinforced 
the FAA’s preeminence and shown a prefer­
ence for enforcing arbitration clauses over 
the years.20 In June 2018, the Court handed 
down another pro­arbitration opinion.21 In 
Epic Systems Corp v Lewis, employees ar­
gued that the National Labor Relations Act 
and the savings clause of the FAA read to­
gether should bar enforcement of manda­
tory arbitration clauses in which employees 
waived their right to participate in class, 
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collective, or representative proceedings.22 
The Court decided by a 5–4 margin that nei­
ther law supersedes the requirement that 
arbitration agreements be enforced.23
Despite Epic and unprecedented use 
of the CRA, there has been increasing in­
terest among congressional Democrats in 
amending the FAA. Since 2015, represen­
tatives have introduced 19 bills24 to limit 
application of the FAA in certain types of 
disputes, 12 of which were introduced in 
the current Congress. In the prior 23 years, 
only 22 similar bills were introduced.25
Thus far, no bills have succeeded. But as 
the issue seems to be a largely partisan one, 
with Democrats favoring limitation of the 
FAA and Republicans favoring enforcement 
as is, it bears watching. Growing public con­
cern about forced arbitration clauses and 
visible efforts to amend the law along with 
an upcoming change in House leadership 
mean the use of mandatory arbitration is 
likely to remain a contentious issue. n
ENDNOTES
1. ABA, Section of Dispute Resolution, Benefits of
Arbitration for Commercial Disputes <https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/
dispute_resolution/committees/arbitration/
arbitrationguide.authcheckdam.pdf> [https://
perma.cc/ML8S-WG97]. All websites cited in
this article were accessed January 11, 2019.
2. Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed), defining
“adhesion contract.”
3. Stone & Colvin, The Arbitration Epidemic: Mandatory
arbitration deprives workers and consumers of their
rights, Economic Policy Institute (December 7, 2015)
<https://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-
epidemic/#epi-toc-9> [https://perma.cc/4PA7-UFHR].
4. Economic Policy Institute, The average consumer in
arbitration with Wells Fargo is ordered to pay the
bank nearly $11,000 (October 3, 2017) <https://
www.epi.org/press/the-average-consumer-in-
arbitration-with-wells-fargo-is-ordered-to-pay-the-bank-
nearly-11000/> [https://perma.cc/V3SE-BLA7].
5. Correia & Puth, The Problem of Sexual Harassment
and Forced Arbitration <https://www.correiaputh.
com/news/problem-sexual-harassment-forced-
arbitration/> and Kent, “Forced” vs. Compulsory 
Arbitration of Civil Rights Claims, 23 Law & Ineq  
95 (2005), available at <https://scholarship.law.
umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1067& 
context=lawineq>.
6. Zaretsky, Elite Law Schools Demand That Biglaw
Firms Disclose Whether Students Will Be Forced
To Sign Arbitration Agreements, AboveTheLaw
(May 14, 2018) <https://abovethelaw.com/
2018/05/elite-law-schools-demand-that-biglaw- 
firms-disclose-whether-students-will-be-forced-to- 
sign-arbitration-agreements/> [https://perma.cc/
YNB9-T28C].
7. Rubino, T14 Law School Groups Taking A Stand
Against Biglaw Mandatory Arbitration Agreements,
AboveTheLaw (December 3, 2018) <https://
abovethelaw.com/2018/12/t14-law-school-groups-
taking-a-stand-against-biglaw-mandatory-arbitration-
agreements/> [https://perma.cc/99RN-RVXW].
8. Uniform Law Commission, Revised Uniform Arbitration
Act, Section 6, Comment 7 (2001), available at
<https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/
DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=
cf35cea8-4434-0d6b-408d-756f961489af&force
Dialog=0> [https://perma.cc/AE5V-UQL7].
9. MCL 691.1681 et seq.
10. Senate Legislative Analysis, SB 901, SB 902,
SB 903 (April 30, 2012), p 7 <http://www.
legislature.mi.gov/documents/2011-2012/
billanalysis/Senate/pdf/2011-SFA-0901-A.pdf>.
11. 9 USC 1 et seq.
12. 9 USC 2.
13. Kalmanson & Cohen, The Real Cost of Mandatory
Arbitration, New York Law Journal (November 23,
2018) <https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/
2018/11/23/the-real-cost-of-mandatory-arbitration/
?slreturn=20181114084620> [https://perma.cc/
RA2G-59DJ].
14. Executive Order No. 13673, Fair Pay and Safe
Workplaces, 79 Fed Reg 45,309 (August 15, 2014),
revoked by Executive Order No. 13782, 82 Fed
Reg 15,607 (March 30, 2017).
15. HR J Res 37, 115th Cong, 131 Stat 75 (2017).
16. 5 USC 801.
17. Guillen, GOP onslaught on Obama’s ‘midnight
rules’ comes to an end, Politico (May 7, 2017)
<https://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/07/
obama-regulations-gop-midnight-rules-238051>
[https://perma.cc/V8C9-USQ6].
18. 12 CFR 1040.
19. HR J Res 111, 115th Cong, 131 Stat 1243 (2017).
20. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion,
563 US 333; 131 S Ct 1740; 179 L Ed 2d 742
(2011) and Kindred Nursing Ctrs Ltd Partnership v
Clark, 581 US   ; 137 S Ct 1421; 197 L Ed 2d 
806 (2017).
21. Epic Systems Corp v Lewis, 584 US   ; 138 S Ct 
1612; 200 L Ed 2d 889 (2018).
22. Id., 138 S Ct 1622.
23. Id.
24. S 1133, 114th Cong (2015); HR 2087, 114th Cong
(2015); HR 6423, 114th Cong (2016); HR 4899,
114th Cong (2016); S 2506, 114th Cong (2016);
S 2697, 114th Cong (2016); HR 4763, 114th Cong
(2016); S 537, 115th Cong (2017); HR 1414, 115th
Cong (2017); HR 7109, 115th Cong (2018); S 550,
115th Cong (2017); HR 1396, 115th Cong (2017);
S 1652, 115th Cong (2017); HR 3467, 115th Cong
(2017); HR 1374, 115th Cong (2018); S 2591, 115th
Cong (2018); S 3615, 115th Cong (2018); S 3064,
115th Cong (2018); HR 6080, 115th Cong (2018).
25. HR 5232, 102nd Cong (1992); S 1619, 103rd Cong
(1993); HR 3905, 105th Cong (1998); S 2546,
105th Cong (1998); S 758, 106th Cong (1999); HR
1283, 106th Cong (2000); HR 3766, 107th Cong
(2001); 107th Cong (2002); HR 2282, S 2435,
107th Cong (2002); 108th Cong (2003); S 2088,
108th Cong (2004); HR 3809, 108th Cong (2004);
S 1373, HR 2969, 109th Cong (2005); S 1782,
110th Cong (2007); HR 3010, 110th Cong (2007);
S 2554, 110th Cong (2008); HR 5129, 110th Cong
(2008); S 931, 111th Cong (2009); HR 1020, 111th
Cong (2009); S 987, 112th Cong (2011); HR 1873,
112th Cong (2011); S 878, 113th Cong (2013);
HR 1844, 113th Cong (2013).
 Virginia Neisler is the 
faculty services librarian 
at the University of Mich-
igan Law School Library. 
She received her JD and 
MSLS from the Univer-
sity of North Carolina 
and is a licensed attorney 
in North Carolina.
